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Abstract 
 Both Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996), in their 
critique of Lakoff and Johnson, draw narrowly from a broad range of reasonable 
interpretations of the metaphors they analyze.  Expanding the interpretations vitiates 
many of Vervaeke and Kennedy’s criticisms, but it supports their call for an open 
interpretation of groups of metaphors, and points toward a more complex elaboration of 
the theories put forth by Lakoff and his colleagues.  The results of applying this approach 
to “ARGUMENT IS WAR” suggest that war is not necessarily the primary conceptual 
metaphor for contentious argument, as Lakoff and Johnson claim.  Rather, there is a 
complex field of contentious interactions, ranging from simple discussions through 
contests to all-out war:  Any and all of these can be and are used as metaphors for the 
others.  When a word or phrase like “defend,” “position,” “maneuver,” or “strategy” is 
used, there is no a priori way to determine whether the intended underlying conceptual 
metaphor is war, an athletic contest, or a game of chess.  Similar analyses are applied to 
other examples from the metaphor literature, and a modification of the basic idea of 
conceptual mapping is proposed, in which metaphors map cognitive responses onto 
prototypical situations rather than mapping one specific experience or concept onto 
another.   
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ARGUMENT IS WAR – Or is it a Game of Chess? 
Multiple Meanings in the Analysis of Implicit Metaphors 
 
 Lakoff and his colleagues (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 1999; Lakoff & Turner, 
1989) propose an account of metaphor as implicit and conceptual.  They identify 
numerous groups or families of metaphors, each organized around a common implicit 
metaphor.  For many of these families of metaphors they trace the underlying metaphor 
to a literal concept based on embodied physical experience; on this basis they claim that 
most conceptual reasoning is fundamentally metaphorical, in that our abstract concepts 
are experienced and expressed in terms of embodied physical experience.   
 Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996) dispute some of the Lakoff group’s arguments and 
question whether the theory of conceptual metaphors is fundamentally falsifiable.  
Vervaeke and Kennedy make an important contribution in arguing for an essentially open 
interpretation of groups of metaphors, with a potential for indefinitely many levels of 
generality, each “’implicit’ in the sense of ‘waiting’ or ‘available’ or ‘apt once they are 
mentioned’” (1996, p. 277).  However, Vervaeke and Kennedy overstate their case, since 
they neglect the potential for falsification through experimental research, and consider 
only a narrow range of reasonable extensions and interpretations of their examples; upon 
closer inspection these metaphors fail to support many of their claims.  On the other 
hand, many of the metaphors produced by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) as evidence of a 
single implicit metaphor can likewise be interpreted in multiple ways.   
In this essay I develop an extended analysis of several metaphors introduced by 
Vervaeke and Kennedy, Lakoff and his colleagues, and others, to show that conceptual 
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metaphors such as “ARGUMENT IS WAR” often emerge from a field of inter-related 
concepts, all available for metaphorical application to each other as well as to external 
concepts, such as business and politics.  The picture that emerges from a more thorough 
interpretation of common metaphors is more complex than Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) 
original account, but I believe it preserves and extends their fundamental insights about 
the interpenetration of culture, thought, and language in the embodied mind.   
Vervaeke and Kennedy’s critique of implicit metaphor theory 
 In stating as a primary objective to “defend the view that some terms are literal or 
standardized,” Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996, p. 273) restrict language to a dichotomy, 
literal or metaphorical.  However, evidence suggests a continuum, ranging from 
expressions virtually everyone would recognize as literal (including genuinely “dead” 
metaphors, such as “salary” and “pedigree”) to those virtually everyone would recognize 
as figurative (Gibbs, 1994; Goatly, 1997; Kittay, 1987; Linzey, 1997; Radman, 1997).  
The orientational metaphors so important to Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) analyses (“The 
stock market is up,” “He and his sister are very close”) are readily recognizable as 
metaphors, even if we do not ordinarily think of them as such (Gibbs, 1992).  Their 
meanings have become lexicalized in the sense that we do not necessarily think of motion 
through space when we speak of “getting closer to a solution” or of the position of one’s 
body when we speak of “taking a stand,” but these meanings are not distinct in the sense 
that, for example, the contemporary meaning of salary has become distinct from “a 
monthly allotment of salt” (Gibbs, Beitel, Harrington, & Sanders, 1994).   
Even a new metaphor, if it strikes the hearer or reader as particularly apt, may 
quickly become “lexicalized” – the “Star Wars” metaphor for Reagan’s Strategic Defense 
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Initiative seemed immediately apt in evoking a sense of Hollywood-originated fantasy, 
but after a few months the reference to the movie series of that name quickly faded from 
attention.  By now, it is unlikely that references to a “Star Wars” defense program 
ordinarily evoke any more than a general sense of “fanciful, expensive, and futuristic.”  
However, that a novel metaphor becomes lexicalized doesn’t mean it ceases to function 
as a metaphor (Gibbs, 1994; Eubanks, 1999; 2000).  When the context requires it, we are 
capable of elaborating on the reference, even if we ordinarily don’t bother (Gentner and 
Bowdle, 2001; Radman, 1997).   
 On the need for a more thorough examination of examples.  Vervaeke and 
Kennedy (1996) begin their critique of the idea that observable patterns in discourse are 
best explained by an underlying implicit metaphor with a group of orientational 
metaphors surrounding money, including “come into money,” “run out of money,” and 
“fall into debt.”  Vervaeke and Kennedy claim that these phrases are inflexible, pointing 
out that it would sound peculiar to extend them as “we came out of money,” “run in 
money,” or “rise out of debt.”  But this argument seems disingenuous:  On the one hand, 
we do say that someone “comes from old money” or “rose out of poverty.”  On the other 
hand, there are also constraints on how we extend literal usages:  We would not say that 
sugar “rose out of the bowl” (cf. Keysar & Glucksberg, 1992).     
Vervaeke and Kennedy’s (1996) other counter-examples are susceptible to similar 
critique.  It is indeed impossible, as they contend, to understand both “she burns me up” 
and “she lights my fire” in terms of a root metaphor “ANGER IS HEAT,” but these 
phrases make sense in terms of the more general “PASSION IS HEAT,” as do the 
opposites, “cool as a cucumber,” “heart like a block of ice,” and “their marriage is an 
IMPLICIT METAPHORS, MULTIPLE MEANINGS 11/2/12         6 
icebox” (Lakoff, 1993, makes a similar point).  Granted that “she burns my fire” is 
ambiguous, but the literal “it burns my fire” is also awkward.  Vervaeke and Kennedy’s 
point, that “one cannot simply group some metaphors, adduce a possible common base, 
and then expect derivations from the base to be apt” (1996, p. 274) is not supported by 
their examples, and I have not been able to think of other examples that cannot similarly 
be vitiated by a more careful analysis.   The point that metaphors cannot be extended any 
which way is valid, but literal usages are subject to similar constraints (Keysar & 
Glucksberg, 1992).  It is often surprising how far a common metaphor can be extended, 
with no more attention to patterns of phrase construction than is required for a literal 
usage.   
 Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) contrast inter-related systems of 
metaphorical expressions, such as “argument is war” and “argument is a journey” with 
idiosyncratic metaphorical expressions that stand alone, e.g., “the foot of a mountain,” “a 
table leg.”  They claim that “a shoulder of the mountain” is used only by mountaineers 
and other specialists, and that any further extension of “mountain is a person” would be 
considered fanciful and literary, e.g., “the mountain had its head in the clouds.”  
Presumably, Lakoff and Johnson would also limit “The north face of a mountain” and 
“the face of a cliff” to specialists; it is a testable hypothesis, whether ordinary day hikers 
would recognize these phrases.  Lakoff and Johnson claim that to speak of an arm, rib, 
thigh, or leg of a mountain would not make sense, but we do speak of an “arm” and the 
“spine” of a mountain range, and mountains sometimes have “hogbacks.”   
Systems of metaphor.  According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), these 
idiosyncratic metaphors do not interact with other metaphors, and don’t play any central 
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role in our conceptual system.  However, further examination suggests that many of these 
metaphors are extensions of a more general conceptual system, in which the body 
provides a metaphorical basis for many physical and conceptual objects.  Sometimes the 
metaphorical extension is via visual resemblance (“leg” of a table or chair, “finger” 
steaks and “finger” lakes, “eye” of a potato or a storm, “hogback” of a mountain), 
sometimes orientational (“foot” of a mountain or of a bed, “footnotes,” “head” of a lake, 
“face” of a cliff, “arm” of a bay), sometimes functional (“head” of a family or an 
organization, “brains” or “eyes and ears” of an organization, “rib” of a boat or a kite, 
“long arm of the law,” “leg” of a table or chair).  There may be idiosyncratic metaphors 
among everyday phrases, and some everyday phrases may represent coherent families of 
metaphor based on singular roots or implicit metaphors, but the evidence thus far is 
consistent with the idea that many everyday phrases represent overlapping and 
interlocking systems of metaphor, affording many possible interpretations (Gentner and 
Bowdle, 2001; Kovecses, 1995; Radman, 1997).   
Another counter-example cited by Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996, p. 274) has this 
same nature.  “Run out of money” may be interpretable as an instance of “MONEY IS A 
PLACE,” but it also makes sense as a subject-object inversion of “money runs out” or of 
the more general “RESOURCES RUN OUT,” a metaphor that can be applied to many 
resources, including gasoline, time, energy, and patience as well as money.  “I’m out of 
gas” can also be interpreted as a metonym for “My tank is out of gas,” an inversion of the 
literal statement, “All the gas is out of my tank.” “I’m out of gas,” spoken at the end of a 
long day, is then a metaphoric reference to the original metonymic expression.  Similarly, 
“I’m out of money” can be interpreted as a metonym for “My wallet is out of money,” an 
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inversion of “All the money is out of my wallet.”  “His luck ran out” and the inversion, 
“he has run out of luck” have similar meanings, as do “his money ran out” and “he has 
run out of money.”  The primary difference seems to be one of active agency:  When one 
has “run out of money” one may be understood to have had more control over the 
situation than when one’s money has “run out.”  Some people may think of an hour-glass 
(“the sands of time”) in connection to running out of time or money; others may think of 
the final trickle from a water bottle.  A person in the desert whose water (literally) runs 
out may soon find that luck and time have also (metaphorically) “run out.”   
Supporting theoretical arguments by analyzing particular metaphors.  There 
are at least three important points here.  First, it appears that groups or families of 
metaphors overlap and possibly interlock (Eubanks, 2000; Gibbs, 1994; Grady, 1997a; 
Kovecses, 1995).  General personification metaphors overlap with other metaphors for 
mountains, journeys, and the like.  Metaphors based on a container of some sort overlap 
with other metaphors for money or luck.  Literal usages sometimes overlap with 
metaphorical (Gibbs, et al., 1993; Keysar, 1994; Radman, 1997):  Gasoline literally runs 
out of the tank, water literally runs out of a leaky canteen, money can run out of a hole in 
one’s pocket, and the sand literally runs out of the top of an hour-glass, but time, luck, 
and money also figuratively “run out.”  Second, it is incumbent upon metaphor analysts 
and theorists to consider carefully their examples (Cameron, 1999a), and to consider 
alternative reasonable interpretations.  Third, and most important, it is incumbent upon 
metaphor analysts to match their level (and depth) of analysis to their rhetorical purposes.  
By considering only a limited a range of interpretation Lakoff and Johnson (1980) as well 
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as Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996) often seem to set up a straw man:  As soon as the range 
of interpretation is expanded, the alleged difficulties vanish.   
Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996, p. 279) provide another group of examples that 
illustrate the same problem, listing a set of expressions that, they claim, point toward an 
implicit metaphor, “PEOPLE ARE WEAPONS.”  But the person in their examples can 
readily be understood as a metonymic reference to “THE MOUTH IS A WEAPON,” with 
entailments that “words are bullets,” just as debaters gather “ammunition” to “shoot 
down” an opponent’s arguments.  Several other of Vervaeke and Kennedy’s examples 
also fall within “THE MOUTH IS A WEAPON,” including “Bill shot his mouth off 
again,” and “Shoot” (meaning “go ahead and tell me”).  The wartime motto, “Loose lips 
sink ships,” may be an instance of the same metaphor, but it can also be taken as a 
metonymic reference to a sequence of actions in which chance comments are overheard 
by spies, etc.  There is no a priori reason to prefer one reading over any other.   
Consistent with one of Vervaeke and Kennedy’s (1996) primary claims, it would 
seem that both the level of generality at which implicit metaphors are to be identified and 
the family of metaphors to which a particular expression belongs are indeterminate (see 
also Keysar, 1994), a conclusion that is entirely consistent with Clark’s (1996) views 
about language use.  It is no doubt true that different individuals may interpret the same 
expression according to different implicit metaphors, and derive different entailments 
(Eubanks, 2000).  It does not, however, necessarily follow that the Conceptual Metaphor 
model is either circular or untestable.  Vervaeke and Kennedy successfully demonstrate 
that the theory proposed by Lakoff and his colleagues cannot be refuted merely by 
producing other, contradictory, metaphorical expressions, but Lakoff’s theory can be and 
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has been tested, refined, and tested again by seeking out evidence of how people actually 
use and interpret metaphors (Brisard, Frisson, & Sandra, 2001; Noveck, Bianco, & 
Castry, 2001).  Metaphors can indeed have multiple and indeterminate roots, as Vervaeke 
and Kennedy insist, but their conclusions don’t necessarily follow:  The existence of 
multiple roots does not cancel the considerable evidence for the role of metaphor in 
conceptual experience and reasoning.  However, their arguments do point up the need for 
abandoning or at least restricting the idea of singular, unique implicit metaphors.   
ARGUMENT IS WAR:  Implicit metaphor or field of metaphorical meanings? 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) return repeatedly to the metaphor, “ARGUMENT IS 
WAR,” as an example to illustrate how metaphors structure our experience of abstract 
concepts and ultimately shape our behavior, in this case our communicative behavior.  
One of Vervaeke and Kennedy’s (1996) most telling points is that this and various other 
metaphors for argument can all be construed in terms of “a process undertaken in a 
certain order,” and that the various kinds of processes undertaken in a certain order can 
be equally well mapped onto each other, with no one process necessarily any more basic 
than the other (p. 276).  Vervaeke and Kennedy overlook a key part of Lakoff and 
Johnson’s argument, that metaphors for abstract concepts are, ultimately, grounded in 
immediate physical experience – but Lakoff and Johnson’s interpretation also seems 
inconsistent with this fundamental principle.  Let us take another look at it.   
Grounding of metaphor in direct experience.  Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999) 
claim that our primary metaphorical systems are grounded first and foremost in our direct 
physical and social experience.  All basic sensorimotor concepts are literal, and the basic 
experiences of dimensionality, orientation, size, etc. form a system of literal concepts, 
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which then form the basis for metaphoric concepts.  Children conflate subjective 
experiences with sensorimotor experiences; these links are established as neural pathways 
that persist as metaphor (“a big problem,” “a close friend”) long after children learn to 
differentiate self from world.  These primary metaphors arise naturally, automatically, 
and unconsciously in everyday experience, then are blended into complex metaphors.   
When different conceptual domains are activated at the same time, new 
connections are formed, leading to new inferences (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; 1999).  
When these inferences are supported by physical and cultural experience, they are 
strengthened (Cameron, 1999b; Gibbs, 1997).  Thus, metaphors are widely shared both 
because of the commonalities of embodied experience (larger objects commonly pose 
greater challenges than smaller ones; the proximity of caregivers is commonly associated 
with gratification of needs) and because culturally prominent metaphors are reinforced in 
everyday conversation.  Complex metaphors coalesce into systems of metaphors that 
serve to structure abstract concepts and provide a basis for reasoning, for drawing 
inferences about the target based on relationships observed in the source (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999).  Because they are widely shared within a culture, complex metaphors 
provide a basis for abstract concepts such as communication (Gibbs, 1997), morality 
(Lakoff, 1996) and international trade (Eubanks, 2000).   
 Experiential grounding for metaphors of argument.  Lakoff and Johnson 
discuss “ARGUMENT IS WAR” in several passages, and return to it repeatedly as an 
example of a complex conceptual metaphor.  In their most elaborate discussion Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980, pp. 77ff.) list several relevant characteristics of argument:  One 
participant has a position, the other participant has a different position, both positions 
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matter inasmuch as one must surrender for the other to achieve victory, the difference of 
opinion becomes a conflict, both participants plan strategy and marshal their forces, 
attack the other’s claims and defend their own, maneuver to achieve a stronger position, 
occasionally retreat before a stronger argument, then attempt to counterattack, etc.  
Lakoff and Johnson then point out that these elements of an argument correspond to 
elements of the concept, “war.”   
 However, many of the elements on this list also correspond to elements of 
concepts such as “chess match,” “bridge game” (Vervaeke & Kennedy, 1996), and other 
competitive activities (Eubanks, 2000).  Chess itself is often used as a metaphor for war 
(Eubanks, 2000) – and war is sometimes used as a metaphor for chess (and other games).  
The names of some chess pieces, in English, suggest a war metaphor (castle, knight) but 
names of other pieces suggest a political metaphor (bishop, queen).  War is also 
frequently used as a metaphor for athletic competition, and for business competition – but 
again, the converse is also true.  Most of the metaphorical expressions Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) cite as evidence for an underlying metaphor, “ARGUMENT IS WAR” are 
also consistent with “ARGUMENT IS CHESS” or “ARGUMENT IS BOXING.”   
 Given the small number of people in the U.S. who have directly experienced war, 
it is not easy to see how “ARGUMENT IS WAR” can be grounded in direct physical or 
social experience, except through media portrayals of war or by way of a chain of 
extensions built on more direct experience, such as “WAR IS BOXING.” On the other 
hand, several of the other activities within this group of inter-related concepts are 
grounded in direct physical and social experience, and thus are directly available for 
metaphorical understanding of argument – and of war.  From a very early age, children 
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engage in heated disputes that lead to verbal and occasionally to physical violence.  They 
engage in competitive contests and games, and in contests of will with siblings, peers, 
parents, and other adults.  Although it is dubious that children have any realistic concept 
of war before they reach adolescence (if then), they certainly have well-developed 
schemas for physical and verbal fighting, contests, and games.   
Children probably acquire the warlike metaphors of their culture in the same way 
they acquire vocabulary for other concepts beyond their personal experience, through 
communication, both interpersonal and mediated.  But how do children come to 
understand the concept of war, if not by metaphorical elaboration of their own embodied 
experience of interpersonal conflict?  It is likely that our experience of both argument and 
war are grounded in the common experience of frustrated desires and the consequent 
conflict of wills, a sequence of events experienced by children from infancy.   
 In short, we need not look to organized adult warfare for an experiential basis to 
ground our understanding of argument; we have a rich experiential basis much closer to 
hand.  I am not arguing that we never understand argument in terms of warfare; indeed, I 
suspect most of us have found ourselves in the kind of argument where one or the other 
antagonist is in a mood to “take no prisoners” and will settle for nothing less than 
“unconditional surrender,” and the stakes escalate beyond ordinary competition.  I am 
suggesting, in concurrence with Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996), that the same 
metaphorical expressions are used in a variety of social contexts, of which all-out war is 
only the most extreme.  War is indeed often used as a metaphor for interpersonal 
argument, but argument is also sometimes used as a metaphor for war, and games are 
often used as a metaphor for both argument and war (see also Eubanks, 2000).   
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However, I do not agree with Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996, p. 276) that it 
necessarily follows that no process is more basic than the others.  If we are to take 
seriously Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) proposal that abstract concepts, as well as novel 
physical and social experiences (such as the experience of war, to those fortunate enough 
never to have experienced it directly), are understood by metaphorical extension of 
immediate “embodied” (physical and social) experience, then the processes of 
interpersonal competition and conflict are more basic than the processes of either war or 
formal academic argument, if only in the sense that they are experienced first, and the 
other forms of conflict that come later are at least initially understood in terms of the 
earlier experiences.  That does not imply, of course, that the later forms of conflict, once 
they have been experienced (if only vicariously, through novels, films and news reports), 
do not in turn provide powerful metaphors for expressing certain aspects of more routine 
forms of conflict, including argument.  
The case for discrete types of metaphors.  Grady (1997a, b; Grady, Taub, & 
Morgan, 1996) argue, on the basis of a reanalysis of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) 
discussion of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, for a distinction between primary and 
compound metaphors.  Several aspects of buildings fail to map onto theories (floors, 
walls, ceiling, etc.), and no direct experiences correlate theorizing with building a 
structure; Grady and his colleagues point out that, if the metaphor is analyzed as a 
compound of LOGICAL STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and PERSISTING IS 
REMAINING ERECT, these difficulties disappear.  However, Grady’s analysis reifies the 
verbal manifestation of a conceptual metaphor:  The propositional form, in this instance 
THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, is but “a mnemonic for a set of ontological 
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correspondences…” (Lakoff, 1993: 207).  The attempt to map building parts such as 
floors, walls, ceiling, etc. onto theories assumes that metaphorical entailments and 
extensions are pushed by the vehicle rather than pulled by whatever users desire to 
convey about the topic.  In the spirit of Lakoff’s (1993) analysis, it would seem sufficient 
that a user casting about for a concept that expresses a particular aspect of theory find an 
instance of that concept in some aspect of buildings.  It seems reasonable to interpret 
THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS in terms of LOGICAL STRUCTURE IS PHYSICAL 
STRUCTURE and PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT, but it also seems reasonable to 
seek a more direct interpretation, in terms of the metaphor user’s immediate experience 
with buildings as exemplars of structured relationships among parts.  Indeed, all of these 
seem to belong to and instantiate different aspects of a single underlying conceptual field.   
Grady’s (1997a) proposal is quite different from Lakoff’s (1993) idea that 
metaphorical mappings are sometimes organized in “inheritance hierarchies.”  Lakoff 
gives the example of LOVE IS A JOURNEY (“Our relationship is going nowhere”), 
which makes use of the structure and inherits the entailments of A PURPOSEFUL LIFE 
IS A JOURNEY, which in turn fits into the event structure metaphor, that maps events 
onto location and motion through space.  Grady’s proposal also differs from the 
distinction between the lexicalized but still lively metaphors (such as EMOTION IS 
HEAT and MORE IS UP) that form the core of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) argument on 
the one hand and the “novel metaphors” discussed at length by Lakoff and Turner (1989) 
and Lakoff (1993: 229 ff.).  These do not necessarily fall into discrete categories, but 
form a continuum, ranging from the metaphors such as EMOTION IS HEAT and MORE 
IS UP, grounded in experiences that begin in very early childhood, through metaphors 
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such as ARGUMENT IS PHYSICAL CONFLICT and SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS ARE 
PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS, grounded in experiences that begin somewhat later in 
childhood, to self-consciously literary metaphors such as the old favorite of metaphor 
theorists, “Juliet is the sun,” and the vernacular “You are my sunshine” (Davis & 
Mitchell, 1940).     
 Verbal combat vs. rational argument.  Lakoff and Johnson (1980, pp. 62ff) 
contrast the kind of verbal combat associated with “argument is war” with rational 
argument, in which participants are expected to follow an architectural rather than a 
military metaphor, to support their positions with reasoning based on evidence rather 
than defend their position with aggressive tactics such as intimidation, threat, or insult, or 
with evasive tactics such as appeal to authority, belittling, evading the issue, flattery, and 
bargaining.   In spite of our stated preference for cool rationality, they claim, we tend to 
conceive of and discuss rational argument in terms of war metaphors, and supposedly 
rational arguments often rely heavily on the “irrational” tactics of combat, even within 
academic, legal, and other contexts where reason is presumed to reign supreme.   
However, many of the tactics Lakoff and Johnson mention (intimidation, threat, 
insult) are more closely related to one-on-one interpersonal conflict than to organized 
warfare, and others belong to domains quite removed from physical violence (e.g., 
evading the issue, bargaining, and flattery).  Rational argument is sometimes undermined 
by tactics metaphorically drawn from organized warfare, but it is also undermined by 
tactics metaphorically drawn from competitive games or the showmanship of a 
professional stage magician (bluffing, distraction, sleight of hand).  During the American 
Civil War, Confederate General Magruder drew on his talent for stagecraft to formulate 
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effective defensive tactics (Catton, 1963) – but that does not make theatrical terms into 
war metaphors!  Rather, the application of dramatical terms (“theater of operations, 
“stage an invasion”) to war is itself metaphorical.  In sum, the examples Lakoff and 
Johnson give to support their contention that argument even in an academic context is 
structured in terms of war are more consistent with the view that common metaphors can 
be interpreted in terms of multiple conceptual metaphors or metaphor systems.  It is an 
empirical question, which of the various metaphorical systems is tapped by a particular 
reader or listener in any particular instance.   
 Argument within a field of conflict metaphors.  It appears that our culture has a 
large, complex, and densely interconnected conceptual field, a set of schemas for 
competition and conflict ranging from friendly, low ego-involvement games through 
highly competitive games, shouting matches, fisticuffs, brawls, all the way to full-scale 
war (see Eubanks, 2000; Gibbs, 1994; 1997).  Within this conceptual field, we readily 
transfer expressions associated with one form of competition or conflict to others.  
Moreover, another form of indirect speech is often at play here, the ironical use of 
understatement and overstatement.  Using understatement, we metaphorically transfer 
terms from fencing, chess, and boxing to speak of one army (in actual warfare) “parrying 
the thrust,” “countering the move,” or “blocking the punch” of another army; using 
overstatement, we metaphorically transfer terms from actual warfare to speak of a 
quarterback “throwing the long bomb” or an orator “overwhelming his opponent’s 
defenses.”  We also use overstatement in saying that an orator “brought his opponent to 
his knees,” a metaphor based on person-to-person combat or athletic competition rather 
than on warfare between armies (Eubanks, 2000, makes a similar point).  Some terms are 
IMPLICIT METAPHORS, MULTIPLE MEANINGS 11/2/12         18 
associated with more than one type of competitive or aggressive activity:  It is not evident 
that “strategy” and “position” are adapted to chess from warfare, rather than the reverse.  
Other terms, such as “submission,” seem more immediately connected with group 
hierarchy and rituals of dominance than with warfare.  To paraphrase von Clausewitz 
(1968), war is itself a continuation of dominance rituals by other means.   
 Metaphor as categorization.  Glucksberg and Keysar (1993) propose that a 
metaphor establishes a superordinate category, to which both vehicle and topic belong, 
that includes all objects having the relevant qualities.  They give the example, “cigarettes 
are time bombs,” which establishes a superordinate category of potentially deadly objects 
that seem harmless at first but eventually kill.  Chiappe & Kennedy (2001) object that it 
is difficult to see what the superordinate category view adds to the search for similarities 
associated with the implied simile view.  Moreover, both the “superordinate category” 
model and the “search for similarities” model are, at least in some instances, inherently 
circular:  Consider another of Glucksberg and Keysar’s examples, “My job is a jail,” 
which places “my job” into “the category of things that the metaphor vehicle jail typifies 
– situations that are unpleasant, confining, difficult to escape from, unrewarding, and so 
on” (Glucksberg, Keysar, & McGlone, 1992, p. 578).  Cigarettes and time bombs do 
share the literal category-defining quality of leading eventually to death but, in the 
absence of legalized slavery, a job does not share the qualities that define jails except in a 
sense that is already metaphorical (Ritchie, 2003; see also Lakoff, 1993).   
 The category of social contentions.  Nevertheless it is useful to look at some 
families of metaphors in terms of superordinate categories.  Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
concede that it is often difficult to distinguish metaphor from subcategorization, because 
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it is not always clear whether two activities are of the same or different kinds.  They give 
as an example, “an argument is a fight.”  If we think of “fight” in general terms, an 
argument is a fight that doesn’t involve blows, and a war is a fight that involves much 
more than blows.  Their point is well-taken, and it can usefully be extended much further.  
It may be useful to think of a very general category of situations, in which two parties 
have opposing ideas, beliefs, intentions, etc., that may or may not lead to violent conflict.  
We might think of this general category as “All Abstractly Similar Contending 
Activities” (Eubanks, 2000) or, more simply, as the category of social contentions.     
 Within the general category of social contentions are several sub-categories, 
including physical fights and other forms of conflict, as well as situations in which the 
contention is primarily between factual propositions, and little of emotional or social 
import is at stake.  When this second sort of contention arises, all participants are less 
concerned that their own proposals are accepted than that the correct or most useful 
proposal is accepted.  When two friends, hiking through the woods, come to a fork in the 
trail, what matters most is that they both take the trail that leads to their destination, not 
that the other person accept their own view as to which trail is the correct one.   
Other sub-categories include those in which material possessions are at stake, 
ranging from control of territory to possession of a house following a divorce, and those 
in which intangible assets such as social status and self-esteem are at stake.  The sub-
categories often blur into one another:  A simple discussion about which trail leads to the 
destination can involve a threat to social status and self-esteem if one’s abilities as an 
outdoorsman seem to be in question.  Ordinarily, an academic dispute is presumed to be 
like the case of hikers coming to a fork in the trail:  What matters most is that we select 
IMPLICIT METAPHORS, MULTIPLE MEANINGS 11/2/12         20 
the best theory, and thus avoid wasting time and resources.  But as Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) point out, issues of prestige and self-esteem often become implicated in an 
academic dispute, and indeed material wealth (in the form of grants, promotions, and so 
forth) are often at stake (see also Sweetser, 1992).  In short, we seem to have a continuum 
of social contentions, running from a simple game or an intellectual discussion at one end 
through violent inter-personal combat (a fist-fight or duel) to group combat (a gang 
rumble or all-out war) at the other:  The higher the perceived stakes, and the lower the 
commitment to continued social interactions among the participants, the farther we are 
likely to move toward the violent end of the continuum.    
 Multiple meanings or metaphorical meanings?  Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996) 
argue for a “multiple meaning” account of terms such as attack and defend, which are 
applied both to warfare and to arguments.  They acknowledge that attack may have 
originated in a metaphorical application, but argue that it has come to have two separate 
and independent meanings.  Consider, “Jane considered his attack on her argument as an 
attack on her intellectual integrity.”  Vervaeke and Kennedy point out that we could 
substitute a synonym such as “refutation of” for the first use of attack and a different 
synonym (“assault”) for the second use, but these could not be interchanged without a 
radical change of meaning:  An assault on an argument is not the same as an attack on an 
argument, and a refutation of one’s intellectual integrity doesn’t make sense at all.  From 
this, Vervaeke and Kennedy conclude that there are actually two separate words, attack 
as a synonym for assault and attack as a synonym for attempt to refute.   
 But compare attack to a true homograph, ring, “a circular object or figure” and 
ring, “to give forth a clear, resonant sound.” These are distinct words, derived from 
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different roots, that happen coincidentally to be spelled and pronounced the same in 
English.  By contrast, attack is one word, with a single root, and all of its many meanings 
have in common a sense of aggression, hostility, and a lack of restraint, in contrast with 
apparent synonyms such as “try to disprove” and “try to refute.”  To attack an argument 
is not the same as to refute an argument, to give a counter-example, or to construct a 
counter-argument.  These are indeed synonyms, but they are substitutable only in a 
particular context, and they are not equivalents.  It is precisely the association, perhaps 
with war, perhaps with a fist-fight, but at least with some form of aggressive conflict, that 
differentiates our response to an attack from our response to a refutation or a counter-
argument.  This sense of aggression and hostility can only derive from a metaphorical 
association with conflict, although not necessarily with war per se.  To attack an 
opponent’s argument is to do something more than merely to try to refute it, and to 
“demolish” an opponent’s argument is to do something much more than merely to 
“demonstrate its inconsistencies.”  That something more is approximately the sense of 
conflict and no-holds-barred antagonism suggested by the metaphorical association with 
childhood name-calling and fist-fights, as well as with adult activities such as mugging 
and all-out war.  It would not seem unreasonable for Jane to interpret an “attack” on her 
argument as an “attack” on her intellectual integrity, but it would seem unreasonable if 
she should interpret an “attempt to refute” her argument as an “assault” on her 
intellectual integrity.  We would expect, or at least condone, an angry and resentful 
response to an “attack,” but we would expect a more reasoned and calm response to an 
“attempt to refute.” 
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Conceptual blending.  Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999) explain the 
metaphorical mapping process in terms of underlying concepts, claiming that we actually 
experience the target concept in terms of the source.  Thus, an exasperated worker who 
complains, “This job is a jail” is inviting the listener to experience the supervisor as a 
prison guard, the workplace as a barred cell, and the employment contract as a sentence.  
A more general account, that subsumes Lakoff and Johnson’s “conceptual metaphors,” is 
provided by conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; 2002; see also 
Coulson & Matlock, 2001).  According to this approach, the conceptual structures of two 
or more “input spaces” (e.g., topic and source) are selectively combined into a new, 
separate, “blended” mental space (the metaphor), which is then available for further 
blending.  “Men are wolves” (Gentner & Bowdle, 2001) combines the schema of men 
who are single-minded and emotionally uninvolved in pursuit of sexual gratification with 
a pre-existing schema of wolves as heartless and vicious predators, itself a prior blend of 
various terrors once associated with life at the edge of a wilderness and the observed and 
imagined behavior of actual wolves in pursuit of their prey.  “My job is a jail” blends the 
mental image of the speaker’s working conditions with a pre-existing schema of jail, 
itself a blend of various emotions associated with social and physical constraints and 
mediated accounts of life in a jail or prison.  Conceptual blending seems to provide a 
non-circular explanation for metaphor interpretation, although I am not yet convinced 
that it represents more than a useful metaphor for poorly-understood neurological 
processes, and it remains unclear what kind of data can falsify it (Gibbs, 2001).    
Are metaphorical meanings fixed?  Speakers sometimes use words with little 
consideration of entailments, and hearers sometimes think very little about these 
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entailments while interpreting an utterance (Steen, 1999).  As Vervaeke and Kennedy 
suggest, a novel metaphor “may be interpreted very differently by different audiences…” 
(1996, p. 283); following Clark (1996), I would suggest that most metaphors, including 
many of the most familiar, are subject to this indeterminacy.  When a term such as 
“attack,” “defend,” or “strategy” appears in a discussion of an argument, we cannot be 
sure whether any particular person will associate the term with chess, boxing, or all-out 
war – or with nothing beyond an abstract concept.  How any particular speaker intends a 
metaphor to be interpreted, and how any particular hearer does interpret the metaphor, 
can never be absolutely determined.   
This indeterminacy of metaphors can be the occasion for serious 
miscommunication:  Consider an argument between friends or spouses, described by one 
participant, thinking of the argument as a chess match, in terms such as “strategy,” 
“attack,” and “defend.” In chess, one hopes the opponent will be willing to repeat the 
engagement in the future, win or lose, but in war, one hopes to win so overwhelmingly 
that there will be no future engagement.  If the other participant associates these terms 
with war, the result is likely to be an unhappy one (Reddy, 1993; Schoen, 1993; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980).  As Vervaeke and Kennedy suggest (albeit with respect to novel 
metaphors), elucidating the conditions under which an individual will make one or 
another set of metaphorical connections, or none at all, is “an important task for empirical 
scientists” (1996, p. 283).    
 Does metaphor influence thought?  Vervaeke and Kennedy insist that “the idea 
that metaphors govern thought needs to be firmly restricted.  Rather, a metaphor is often 
chosen from a set of alternative metaphors with widely differing implications to express 
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an idea that is literal” (1996, p. 283).   I do not see these as mutually exclusive ideas – 
although “governs” may be rather too strong a metaphor, and “literal” is difficult to 
define precisely (Gibbs, 1994; Kittay, 1987; Rumelhart, 1993).  If many of our abstract 
concepts are themselves shaped by structural metaphors, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 
1999) contend, then we do not have very many truly “literal” ideas to express, beyond the 
basic ideas that are grounded in direct physical experience, like “I fell down,” “I stood 
up,” and “I ate a carrot.”   
Metaphor can be hypothesized to influence thought in at least two ways, without 
contradicting the hypothesis that people more or less deliberately select metaphors to 
express their ideas as clearly as possible.  First, to the extent that the language most 
readily available for discussing an abstract concept is shaped by a certain set of 
metaphors, we will find it difficult to express contradictory ideas about that concept 
without inventing new metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; 1999; Reddy, 1993; 
Schoen, 1993).  Second, to the extent that a hearer is induced to process the entailments 
of a metaphor, these entailments will become part of the meaning of the concept in the 
present context (Kovecses, 1995).  It is, indeed, for this reason that a speaker would 
choose one metaphor rather than another:  It would be no use choosing an expression 
based on “LOVE IS A JOURNEY” rather than “LOVE IS A NATURAL DISASTER” if the 
entailments particular to each implicit metaphor could not be expected to have a 
distinctive influence on the thoughts and responses of the listener.   
Metaphor as field of associated cognitive responses  
 I would like to propose an alternative account, that goes part of the way with 
Vervaeke and Kennedy, yet preserves the most important insights from Lakoff and 
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Johnson’s analysis.  As suggested by Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996, p. 282), words like 
attack and defend have, through various metaphorical extensions, taken on a broader set 
of meanings, connected not only with discourse about war and other situations of 
conflict, but also with aggressive forms of argument and aggressive interactions in 
general.  Such a metaphorical extension creates a “field” of meanings (Katz, 1992), 
including the entailments, images, responses, and expectations evoked by the metaphor 
vehicle, as well as with the various topics to which the metaphor is typically or routinely 
applied.  It little matters whether the conflict metaphors discussed by Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) originate with war, with childhood rough-and-tumble, or with other forms of 
conflict; they carry a set of potential meanings derived from all of these, and from their 
application to chess, bridge, basketball, and school debate tournaments as well.  This full 
range of entailments, images, responses and expectations is available as part of the 
common base of language and experience (Clark, 1996; Eubanks, 2000; Gibbs, 1994; 
1997) whenever the words that belong to a group of metaphors are used, although only 
some of them will be intended by a speaker, and not all of them will be accessed by 
someone who hears or reads the metaphor.   
As Clark (1996) observes, a hearer often interprets an utterance (literal or 
metaphorical) to mean something different from what the speaker intended, and the 
problem of coordinating what the speaker is taken to mean is by no means trivial.  In 
many cases, including stock phrases such as “the stock market is falling,” a preferred 
meaning has been so completely lexicalized as to eliminate much of the ambiguity.  
However, even some stock phrases continue to afford a certain level of ambiguity:  If 
“the grass is greener on the other side of the fence,” does the speaker engage in self-
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criticism because her neighbor works harder (“has a prettier lawn”) or does she indulge 
in envy for her neighbor who has more opportunities (“has better forage”)?  Often the 
context provides clues, as Romeo’s line, “But soft! What light through yonder window 
breaks?” helps us make sense of the following, “It is the east, and Juliet is the sun” 
(Shakespeare, 1952:  Act Two Scene II, 3-4), but as the persistent critical speculations 
about Shakespeare’s metaphor demonstrate (e.g., Searle, 1993), context doesn’t 
necessarily eliminate ambiguity (cf. Stern, 2000).   
Non-directional metaphors.  In some cases, metaphors are one-way streets, and 
the field of meanings is derived entirely from the vehicle.  Phrases associated with “A 
LIFE IS A JOURNEY” call upon those entailments of journey that seem applicable to life; 
the reverse, “A JOURNEY IS A LIFE,” does not make sense (except perhaps in some very 
peculiar context).  However, when a set of vehicles and targets (war, athletic games, and 
argument) all have characteristics that shed light on the others, the metaphors are 
reversible, and the fields of meaning created by reversing the metaphors may become 
partially blended (Turner & Fauconnier, 1999).  Thus, it can make sense to describe war 
in terms of argument or argument in terms of war, war in terms of boxing or boxing in 
terms of war.  The entailments are of course reversed (Gibbs, 1994):  “an athletic contest 
is war” or “trade is war” (Eubanks, 2000) invests sports or trade with aggressiveness and 
ruthlessness, but “war is an athletic contest” or “war is trade” invests war with a sense of 
rules and fair play on the one hand or with a sense of rational calculation of potential 
gains and losses on the other.  The fields of meaning created by these transposed 
metaphors can blur into one another, until it does not seem strange to use both, together, 
as a metaphor for argument, business, or politics, and in some cases it seems to be 
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difficult to establish with any certainty whether the vehicle of a metaphorical expression 
is intended to be “war,” “sports,” or “chess.”     
 Metaphors as mapping of cognitive responses.  Finally, I would like to propose 
a modification to the “conceptual metaphor” approach (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and 
suggest that, at least in some instances, metaphors evoke a set of responses (emotions, 
social relationships, cultural and physical expectations, etc.), that may be associated 
primarily with the vehicle, or may be uniquely evoked by the combination of vehicle and 
topic.  It is these expectations and emotional responses that establish the basis for 
comparison and define the “superordinate category” (Keysar & Glucksberg, 1992) to 
which a topic is assigned by a metaphor, and not necessarily any of the particular 
qualities of the metaphor vehicle.  Thus, we need not find any qualities common to Juliet 
and the sun in order to make sense of Romeo’s declaration that “Juliet is the sun” 
(Shakespeare, Act II, Scene II, line 3).  From the preceding phrases, “What light through 
yonder window breaks?  It is the east,” we know that Romeo wishes to tell us that the 
sight of Juliet’s face in the window arouses in him the same sort of responses and 
expectations that the rising sun elicits. From the immediately subsequent lines, beginning 
“Arise, fair sun, and kill the envious moon, Who is already sick and pale with grief…” 
we further learn that the sight of Juliet’s face arouses in him the same expectations, with 
respect to her potential competitors (Rosaline in particular, mentioned by Mercutio in the 
immediately preceding scene), that the sun arouses with respect to the moon and stars.  
There are no qualities common to a young woman and the sun that could possibly define 
a superordinate category, and none is needed:  What their metaphorical juxtaposition 
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brings to the fore is the kind of emotions, comparisons, and expectations they each 
arouse.    
At least in the case of metaphors that express such widely shared experience that 
they have become stock expressions in a culture, the correlations evoked by a metaphor 
are not between particular qualities or types, but between emotions, sensations, and 
expectations on the one hand and the situations that typically evoke these cognitive states 
on the other.  The correlated cognitive states may be activated by the juxtaposition of 
topic and vehicle, as with “Juliet is the sun,” or they may be activated by the vehicle 
alone:  Tourangeau and Rips (1991) found that subjects can readily interpret blank 
metaphors, of the form “X is the Napoleon of birds.”  Similarly, in THEORIES ARE 
BUILDINGS (Grady, 1997a), our evaluative responses and expectations to theories draw 
upon another blank metaphor, “X IS A BUILDING” ( “X has a firm foundation,” “X is 
falling apart,” “construct a solid X”), and “My job is a jail” (Keysar & Glucksberg, 1992) 
instantiates a more general blank metaphor, “X IS CONFINEMENT.”  
In “My job is a jail,” the metaphor is established, not by “situations that are 
unpleasant, confining, difficult to escape from, unrewarding, and so on” (Glucksberg, 
Keysar, & McGlone, 1992, p. 578) but by our responses to these situations.  A similar 
sense of constraint is captured in a number of related expressions, for example, an 
adolescent may complain that “this house is a prison,” or, if he is really frustrated, “a 
concentration camp.”  An old dysphemism for a domineering spouse is “ball and chain,” 
and we speak of being “stuck in a rut,” “mired in indecision,” “bound hand and foot,” 
“tied down,” and so forth.  What these all have in common is a feeling of restricted 
action, choices, or options.  The associated emotion may be reactance, as when an 
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adolescent describes his home and family as a “prison” or “concentration camp,” 
dissonance reduction, as when a worker describes her job as a “jail” (and thereby denies 
her actual ability to quit and seek an alternative job), or even an ironical expression of 
affection and commitment, as in “Blest be the tie that binds” (Fawcett, 1782) and “I keep 
the ends out for the tie that binds” (Cash, 1956).  The sense of incapacity to change a 
situation, nullify a social or emotional commitment, or find the answer to a problem or 
puzzle is almost impossible to express except through some metaphor associated with 
bondage or confinement.   
 As with the metaphorical field surrounding confrontation, people begin from an 
early age to experience feelings of frustration, reactance, and cognitive dissonance – as 
well as the more positive feelings of challenge and competitive stimulation – when they 
find themselves physically, socially, or intellectually constrained.  Infants and young 
children experience unpleasant physical constraint in their cribs and high chairs or when 
adults or older children block their access to fragile or dangerous items, but they also 
delight in being loosely constrained in an adult’s limbs while they try to wriggle free.  
Later, as they become socialized, children experience social constraint when some 
desired action is prohibited by adults, when faced with a choice between equally 
desirable objects or courses of action, when constrained by a previously given promise or 
by the threat of social disapproval.  The subjective experiences elicited by social 
constraints and intellectual puzzles are similar in various ways to each other and to those 
elicited by physical constraints, and the many forms of physical and social constraint are 
ready to hand for expressing and understanding these experiences.  In conversations and 
in mass media we encounter a large field of other constraints that provide a ready source 
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of metaphors, including jail, prison, ball and chain, briar patches, tangled yarn, jungles, 
indebtedness, mazes, puzzles, monastic vows, and so on.   
 The complex feelings aroused by physical or social constraints are associated in 
our memories, and they do form a “category” of sorts.  But the category is defined, not in 
terms of “things that are confining, punitive, and impossible to escape” (Glucksberg, 
Keysar & McGlone, 1992, p. 578), but in terms more like “things that give me feelings 
and expectations associated with constraint, challenge, frustration, and reactance.”  
Glucksberg et al. contend that “jail” is the prototypical member of such a category, but as 
with the “category” of social confrontations, there are many exemplars, each expressing a 
subtly different aspect of the underlying experience, including “strait jacket,” “tied up,” 
“chained,” “in hock,” and “married” (as in “married to a theory”).    
Conclusion:   
Although I concur with the general thrust of Vervaeke and Kennedy’s (1996) 
critique, I have argued that they overstate their case, in part because of an excessively 
narrow interpretation of their examples.  Close analysis of both commonplace and 
original metaphors can help to illuminate the embodied interactions among language, 
thought, and culture, but the interpretations must be thorough, open to additional 
interpretive paths, and, at least in principle, informed by the variety of rhetorical and 
cultural contexts in which the metaphors are actually used.   
I have extended Vervaeke and Kennedy’s criticism of the proposition that a 
collection of metaphors is necessarily interpretable only with respect to a single implicit 
metaphor at a single level, arguing that the phrases Lakoff and Johnson interpret in terms 
of “ARGUMENT IS WAR” emerge from a field of inter-related concepts, including 
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athletic contests, games, and interpersonal quarrels as well as war and argument:  The 
associations of each of these concepts are available for metaphorical application to the 
others as well as to external concepts such as business and politics.  I have argued that it 
is more consistent with Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphorical grounding to base 
our understanding of the entire set of contention metaphors on the sort of competitive 
games and interpersonal conflict that are experienced from early childhood throughout 
the life-span.  A similar analysis can be applied to any complex field of metaphors, as I 
have shown with respect to metaphors of constraint.   
It is more complex, but the picture that emerges from a more extended and 
thorough interpretation of common metaphors leaves the broad outlines of Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (1980) original account more or less intact.  Although there is insufficient 
space here to work out the details, I believe the two accounts are compatible, and a 
combination of both may be required for a complete understanding of metaphor.  The 
account I propose seems particularly consistent with Lakoff’s (1993) point, previously 
cited, that the propositional expression of a conceptual metaphor is but a mnemonic, and 
not to be accorded independent status.  In addition to Lakoff and Johnson’s neat pyramid 
of conceptual metaphors, building from the most basic physical experiences of 
orientation, pain, and so forth toward extremely abstract concepts such as love, causality, 
and God, we may find that we have several recursive, continually reconstructed fields of 
figurative / literal concepts, in which the metaphorical mappings link cognitive responses 
and expectations to an overlapping continuum of prototypical experiences, and we may 
often be unable to determine with certainty how a particular speaker intends or a 
particular listener interprets a given metaphor.  
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   I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer, and especially Dr. Ray Gibbs, for 
their many thoughtful and provocative comments on earlier drafts of this essay, which 
has been considerably improved as a result.  Any remaining oversights, omissions, or 
mistakes are of course entirely my own responsibility.   
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